Failure to address the shortcomings of pilot and MCAS software design can be two mistakes that lead to Boeing's plane crash.
Fragment of Ethiopian Airlines in the field. Picture : AFP.
There were 157 deaths in an Ethiopian plane crash on March 10, and 189 deaths in October last year due to the Lion Air tragedy in Indonesia, raising questions about 737 MAX 8 aircraft. Both Boeing used the same expression as before the accident.
For Ethiopian Airlines, only three minutes after take-off, the pilot must signal an emergency landing at an alarming rate of speed exceeding the safety limit. For Lion Air, the first plane drops 20 times in the last 12 minutes of travel, and Captain must request an emergency.
follow Atlantic OceanThe Boeing 737 MAX has different control functions than the previous 737 model. This is because the engine rises above the wing and ascends forward. This change in position tends to "lift" the aircraft during flight, putting the aircraft at risk. The Boeing 737 MAX supplemented the flight control enhancement system (MCAS) to solve the situation by automatically controlling the aircraft when the sensor recognized the risk of failure.
The most widely accepted hypothesis for a lion aircraft crash is a sensor that causes the MCAS to keep the information from being read and to control the aircraft to tilt continuously until it falls to the sea even if there is an attempt. The post-accident question is whether the Lion Air pilot can accurately tell how the MCAS works or how to turn off the system. Now the same question reappears in an Ethiopian plane crash.
Wally Magathan, a former air force pilot, said Boeing made two major mistakes at the 737 MAX. The first is that the MCAS system relies solely on a single data source of the angle sensor to provide automatic tuning options without redundant sensors or comparative data. Second, Boeing did not teach the pilot how to handle the MCAS system when he thought there was a problem.
According to Magathan, an inexperienced freight manager, separating the MCAS system and regaining control of the aircraft is a very simple and complete measure of performance. "It's certainly easier to handle engine failures and hydraulic system losses," he said.
However, when the plane wanted to install the nose unexpectedly and the pilot did not know about the MCAS and did not understand why, the pressure on them grew. When a series of warning lights blink and an audible alarm sounds, an inexperienced pilot can easily fall into a panic. Therefore, it is the least of course to educate and manipulate new systems as well as how to handle the situations that airlines can do.
"From a pilot's point of view, we do not have to ban flying the entire 737 MAX fleet, but do not allow it to be piloted until all pilots are trained, a complete guide to the MCAS", Magathan shares .
To date, the 737 MAX 8 can not fly all over the world, and Boeing, a renowned aircraft manufacturer for safety and reliability, will suffer huge losses. Boeing 's stock fell 12% over the next few days after the plane crash in Ethiopia, bringing the company' s capital to over $ 30 billion.
The 737 MAX production line is still operational, but the US group has announced it will stop delivering aircraft to passengers until an Ethiopian plane crash investigation is made.